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Private International Law Aspects of Authors’ Contracts:
The Dutch and French Examples
Jane C. Ginsburg* and Pierre Sirinelli**
ABSTRACT
Copyright generally vests in the author, the human creator of the work. But
because, at least until recently, most authors have been ill-equipped to
commercialize and disseminate their works on their own, the author has granted
rights to intermediaries to market her works. Since most authors are the weaker
parties to publishing, production, or distribution contracts, the resulting deal may
favor the interests of the intermediary to the detriment of the author’s interests.
Many national copyright laws have introduced a variety of corrective measures,
from the very first copyright act, the 1710 British Statute of Anne, which instituted
the author’s reversion right (still in force, albeit much modified, in U.S. copyright
law), to detailed limitations on the form and scope of grants found in many
continental European copyright laws. Recently, the Netherlands and France have
amended their copyright laws to reinforce author-protective provisions; the French
reforms particularly envision the publishing contract in the digital environment.
But many author contracts, especially in the digital environment, grant rights
for multiple territories: how does the international dimension of these agreements
affect the practical ability of individual countries to regulate authors’ contracts
with respect to exploitations occurring within their borders? If, on the one hand,
“lawmakers tend to be provincial in developing copyright-contract rules,
remaining focused on largely local parties and interests rather than on policies
common to many jurisdictions,” and, on the other, general principles of private
international law leave to the parties the determination of the law applicable to
their contract, may the parties simply avoid “provincial” protections of authors’
economic interests by choosing (or the stronger party imposing) the law of a less
author-interventionist jurisdiction to govern the full territorial extent of the
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transfer?
This Article will first discuss two examples of reforms of copyright-contract law,
then will consider the extent to which private international law rules may render
these reforms largely ineffective for authors who grant rights for multiple
territories. Finally, we will propose private international law approaches that
preserve local author-protective contract restrictions without rendering the
implementation of the international agreement unduly cumbersome or
unpredictable. We recognize that our approach departs from classic, contentneutral, private international law rules, because it seeks to impose a particular
outcome. But content-neutral choice of law rules are what create the problem that
provoked this examination in the first place: the rule of “party autonomy,” that
directs courts to look to the law the parties choose for their contract enables the
stronger party to avoid weaker party protections simply by submitting the contract
to a less-constraining national law. The proposed rule remains within the general
private international law (nonsubstantive) framework because it in no way
instructs states to adopt author-protective measures. It simply endeavors to ensure,
if a state does determine to recalibrate the balance of power between authors and
exploiters, that the contract not set the state’s efforts to protect its resident authors
to naught.
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INTRODUCTION
Copyright generally vests in the author, the human creator of the work.1 But
because, at least until recently, most authors have been ill equipped to
commercialize and disseminate their works on their own, the author has granted
rights to intermediaries to market her works. Since most authors are the weaker
parties to publishing, production, or distribution contracts, the resulting deal may
favor the interests of the intermediary to the detriment of the author’s. Many
national copyright laws have introduced a variety of corrective measures, from the
very first copyright act, the 1710 British Statute of Anne, which instituted the
author’s reversion right2 (still in force, albeit much modified, in U.S. copyright
law3), to detailed limitations on the form and scope of grants found in many
continental European copyright laws.4 Recently, the Netherlands and France have
amended their copyright laws to reinforce author-protective provisions; the French
reforms particularly envision the publishing contract in the digital environment.
But many author contracts, especially in the digital environment, grant rights for
multiple territories: how does the international dimension of these agreements
affect the practical ability of individual countries to regulate authors’ contracts with
respect to exploitations occurring within their borders? If, on the one hand,
“lawmakers tend to be provincial in developing copyright-contract rules, remaining
focused on largely local parties and interests rather than on policies common to
many jurisdictions,”5 and, on the other, general principles of private international
law leave to the parties the determination of the law applicable to their contract,
may the parties simply avoid “provincial” protections of authors’ economic
interests by choosing (or the stronger party imposing) the law of a less authorinterventionist jurisdiction to govern the full territorial extent of the transfer?
1. Some countries, however, including the United States and the Netherlands, vest copyright in
works made by employees in the course of their employment in the employer, who may often be a
juridical person.
2. Act for the Encouragement of Learning (Statute of Anne), 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 11 (U.K.)
(“[T]he sole right shall return to the author” if still living at the expiration of the initial fourteen year
copyright term.).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012) (creating the inalienable right to terminate grants thirty-five years
after the execution of the contract).
4. See, e.g., Loi 92-597 du 1 juillet 1992 [Code of Intellectual Property], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.], July 3, 1992, arts. L. 131-1-132-30 [hereinafter French Code of
Intellectual Property]; Germany, Gesetz über Urheberrect und verwandte Schutzrechte
(Urheberrechtsgesetz) [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, §§ 31–32(B), 36 [hereinafter German Copyright
Act]; Belgium, Loi Relative au Droit D’Auteur et aux Droits Voisins [Law on Copyright and
Neighboring Rights] of June 30, 1994 (as amended by the Law of Apr. 3, 1995), arts. 3, 11, 24, 26, 55
[hereinafter Belgian Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights]. For an analysis of particular national
laws’ provisions on authors’ contracts, see, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE
(Lionel Bently ed., LexisNexis 2015). On amendments to the German author-protective provisions, see,
e.g., William R. Cornish, The Author as Risk-Sharer, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 8–16 (2002); Wilhelm
Nordemann, A Revolution of Copyright in Germany, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1041 (2002); see
generally, Paul Katzenberger, Protection of the Author as the Weaker Party to a Contract under
International Copyright Contract Law, 19 I.I.C. 731 (1988).
5. Paul Edward Geller, International Copyright: The Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE supra note 4, at INT–259.
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This Article will in Part I discuss two examples of reforms of copyright-contract
law; Part II will then consider (A) the extent to which private international law
rules may render these reforms largely ineffective for authors who grant rights for
multiple territories, and (B) will propose private international law approaches that
preserve local author-protective contract restrictions without rendering the
implementation of the international agreement unduly cumbersome or
unpredictable.
I. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE DUTCH AND FRENCH LAWS
ON AUTHORS’ CONTRACTS
A. DUTCH COPYRIGHT CONTRACT ACT6
Under Dutch law, employers are the copyright owners of employee-created
works.7 But the Dutch version of works made for hire does not extend to works by
freelance creators. As to nonemployee authors, the new copyright law announces a
principle of strict interpretation of the scope of contracts: the grant “shall comprise
only the rights that are stated in the deed or that necessarily derive from the nature
and purpose of the title or the grant of the license.”8 This provision confirms prior
case law narrowly interpreting the scope of grants in the context of modes of
exploitation developed after the conclusion of the contract.9 By contrast, in some
countries, in the absence of a statutory rule of interpretation, courts treat the scope
of copyright licenses as a question of contract law.10
The Dutch law contains several nonwaivable provisions assuring authors “fair
compensation.”11 As a general rule, contracts are to stipulate fair compensation for
grants of rights of exploitation, and the Minister of Education, Culture and Science
is to “determine the amount of fair compensation for a specific sector and for a
certain period of time” upon the “joint request of an association of makers existing
in the relevant sector and a commercial user or an association of commercial users.
This request shall contain jointly agreed advice regarding fair compensation and a
6. Wet auteurscontractenrecht [Copyright Contract Act of June 30, 2015] Stb. 2015, p. 257,
http://www.ipmc.nl/en/topics/new-copyright-contract-law-netherlands
[http://perma.cc/6F72-37PD]
(Visser Schapp & Kreijger trans.) (amending the Dutch Copyright Act of 1912) [hereinafter Dutch
Copyright Contract Act]. Thanks to the law firm of Visser Schaap & Kreijger for the English translation
of the Act.
7. Auteurswet [Dutch Copyright Act of 1912] Stb. 1912, p. 308 art. 7 [hereinafter Dutch
Copyright Act].
8. Dutch Copyright Contract Act art. 1A (modifying art. 2 of the Dutch Copyright Act).
9. See, e.g., Dist. Ct. Amsterdam 24 Sept. 1997, AMI 1997, 9, p. 194, NJV (Freelancers/
Volkskrant newspaper) (holding that a 1980s publishing contract did not cover digital exploitations).
10. For example, in the United States the rule of interpretation is considered a matter of state
contract law, which may lead to different outcomes. Compare Cohen v. Paramount Pictures, 845 F.2d
851 (9th Cir. 1988) with Boosey & Hawkes v. Disney, 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998) (both interpreting
the scope of synchronization licenses and reaching different conclusions as to the extension of the
licenses to cover distribution of videocassettes to the public).
11. Dutch Copyright Contract Act art. 25h(1) (non waivability). Art. 45d(2), however, excludes
video on demand from the principal director’s and screenwriter’s statutory rights to fair compensation.
The rationale for this exclusion is unclear.
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clear definition of the sector to which the request relates.”12 The law’s “bestseller
clause” provides for additional compensation when “the agreed compensation is
seriously disproportionate to the proceeds from the exploitation of the work,”
although the law does not define “seriously disproportionate.”13 (The German
copyright law has long had such a clause, so case law under that provision may
provide some guidance.)14 The law provides a further source of remuneration
when the contract explicitly covers uses unknown at the time of contracting: the
original grantee or its successor(s) must provide additional compensation for those
new uses.15
The law reverts rights to the author upon notifying the grantee “if the other party
to the contract does not sufficiently exploit the copyright to the work within a
reasonable period after having concluded the contract, or does not sufficiently
exploit the copyright after having initially performed acts of exploitation.”16 While
the reversion right may not be waived, the law does not define these terms.
Perhaps the dispute resolution committees the law establishes will resolve these and
other issues that the law leaves open.17
B. FRENCH LAW LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE OF AUTHORS’ CONTRACTS
The French Code of Intellectual Property safeguards authors against leonine
transfers in a variety of ways. In addition to mandating that publishing contracts,
performance rights contracts, and audiovisual production contracts be in writing,18
the law further requires that each right granted be distinctly specified in the
contract, and that the scope of the grant be defined with respect to its purpose, its
geographic extent, and its duration.19 As a general rule, authors are to receive
royalties, rather than a lump sum payment; the law lists limited instances in which a
flat fee is permitted.20 Amendments to the statutory provisions on publishing
contracts, introduced at the end of 2014, further detail authors’ rights in print and
digital editions of literary works.21 These modifications seek to ensure that
publishers will in fact exercise the rights that authors grant them, and will fairly
account to authors for the fruits of those exploitations. Failure to publish the work
within a certain time, or to pursue the exploitation of the rights in a consistent
manner (exploitation permanente et suivie), or to reissue a book that has gone out
12. Id. art. 25c.
13. Id. art. 25d.
14. German Copyright Act art. 32a (as last amended by Article 8 of the Act of 1 October 2013
(Federal Law Gazette Part I, p. 3714)).
15. Dutch Copyright Contract Act art. 25c(6).
16. Id. art 25e.
17. Id. art 25g.
18. French Code of Intellectual Property art. L131-2. U.S. copyright law requires that the grant
of any exclusive right must be in writing and signed by the grantor. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012).
19. French Code of Intellectual Property art. L131-3. The author may grant rights for future
modes of exploitation unknown at the time of the contract, but such a grant must be explicit, and must
provide for a share in the profits of the new form of exploitation. Id. art. L131-6.
20. Id. art. L131-4, L132-6.
21. Id. art. L132-17-1 et seq.
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of print, will result in reversion of print or electronic rights to the author.
The new provisions require the grant to distinguish print from digital editions
(any contract that grants digital rights but fails to include a distinct section
regarding their exploitation will be void), and impose additional author protections
with respect to the latter.22 Notably, the contract must guarantee authors “just and
fair remuneration” for all the revenues deriving from the commercialization and
dissemination of digital editions.23 The law acknowledges the possibility of flat fee
payments, but significantly constrains the circumstances under which publishers
may avail themselves of that form of remuneration: the law expressly prohibits
grants of all digital rights and over all forms of exploitation. Rather, flat fee
payments “are allowed only for a specific operation, and every new operation for
which a flat fee is permitted requires a renegotiation of the fee.”24 In addition,
contracts granting electronic rights must include a clause providing for periodic
review of the economic conditions of the grant;25 an accord between associations of
authors and of publishers will determine the frequency of the reviews and will
provide guidelines for dispute resolution.26
The law also promotes the
development of digital editions: a grantee that fails to disseminate a digital edition
within the time set out in an accord between associations of authors and of
publishers will lose those rights back to the author.27 Moreover, and rather
unusually, the law applies even to contracts concluded before the law’s effective
date: for two years after the law’s entry into force, the law empowers authors to
demand that the publisher produce a digital edition; the publisher’s failure to do so
within three months following proper notification results in reversion of the digital
rights to the author.28
II. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSEQUENCES OF THE
DUTCH AND FRENCH LAWS ON AUTHORS’ CONTRACTS
A. APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND GENERAL PIL RULES
Before we examine the specific cases of the Dutch and French laws, we recall
22. Id. art. L132-17-1: « Lorsque le contrat d’édition a pour objet l’édition d’un livre à la fois
sous une forme imprimée et sous une forme numérique, les conditions relatives à la cession des droits
d’exploitation sous une forme numérique sont déterminées dans une partie distincte du contrat, à peine
de nullité de la cession de ces droits. »
23. Id. art. L132-17-6.
24. Id. « Dans les cas prévus de recours à un forfait, ce dernier ne saurait être versé à l’auteur en
contrepartie de la cession de l’ensemble de ses droits d’exploitation sous une forme numérique et pour
tous les modes d’exploitation numérique du livre. Dans les cas de contributions à caractère accessoire
ou non essentiel mentionnés au 4° de l’article L. 131-4, une telle cession est possible.
Le forfait ne peut être justifié que pour une opération déterminée et toute nouvelle opération
permettant le recours à un forfait s’accompagne de sa renégociation. »
25. Id. art. L132-17-7.
26. Id. art. L132-17-8(8).
27. Id. art. L132-17-5.
28. Ordonnance n° 2014–1348 du 12 Novembre 2014, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAISE [J.O.], Nov. 13, 2014, p. 19101, art. 9. Articles 11 and 12 provide for application of other
author protections to contracts concluded before the law’s effective date. Id. art. 11–12.
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some general rules of private international law and copyright contracts. The
determination of applicable law first turns on the characterization of the issue.
Matters of substantive copyright law, including the rights conveyed by the contract,
are governed by the lex protectionis, or law of the country for which protection is
sought, i.e., where the work is exploited.29 Matters of contract are submitted to the
law chosen by the parties to the contract (if the contract includes a choice of law
provision) or to the law of the country in which the contractual relationship is
localized. In the EU, the Rome I Regulation establishes criteria for identifying the
law governing the contract (lex contractus).30
In the case of copyright contracts, defining which matters come within the
domain of a national copyright law and which fall within the domain of the law of
the contract is an exercise fraught with controversy. The respective rights of the
parties to the contract may resolve differently depending on which law applies. In
particular, if national law prohibits the transfer of certain rights—such as moral
rights or rights to modes of exploitation unknown at the time of the contract’s
conclusion—may an author nonetheless grant the right in full for all territories if
she and her co-contractantchoose the law of a country that permits such transfers?31
Or, suppose the national copyright law conditions the validity of a transfer of rights
on compliance with obligations respecting the mode of payment or of execution of
the contract. For example, the new French law on publishing contracts provides for
a reversion of rights if the grantee fails to exercise them within a given period.32
Moreover, as seen in both the Dutch and the French laws, national copyright laws
may permit the grant of rights in new modes of exploitation, but require additional
payment in return.33 Or suppose the national law conditions the validity of the
transfer on compliance with certain formal prerequisites, such as that the contract
be in writing and signed by the author, or that the contract distinctly identify each
mode of exploitation for which it transfers rights.34 Or suppose the national
copyright law sets out a rule of interpretation calling for strict construction of
29. ALI Principles of Intellectual Property § 301 (2008); European Max Planck Group on
Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, Principles on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property art.
3:102 (2011) [hereinafter CLIP].
30. REGULATION (EC) No 593/2008 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations [hereinafter Rome I].
31. See, e.g., Belgian Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights art. 3(1)(6) (only the clause is
void, not the contract as a whole); French Code of Intellectual Property art. L121-1(3) (moral rights are
inalienable).
32. French Code of Intellectual Property art. L132-17-2 (III) (« III.- La cession des droits
d’exploitation sous une forme numérique est résiliée de plein droit lorsque, après une mise en demeure
de l’auteur adressée par lettre recommandée avec demande d’avis de réception, l’éditeur ne satisfait pas
dans un délai de six mois à compter de cette réception, aux obligations qui lui incombent à ce titre. »);
art. L132-17-5 (« Lorsque l’éditeur n’a pas procédé à cette réalisation, la cession des droits
d’exploitation sous une forme numérique est résiliée de plein droit. »).
33. Dutch Copyright Contract Act art. 25c(6); French Code of Intellectual Property art. L131-6 («
La clause d’une cession qui tend à conférer le droit d’exploiter l’oeuvre sous une forme non prévisible
ou non prévue à la date du contrat doit être expresse et stipuler une participation corrélative aux profits
d’exploitation. »)
34. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C § 204(a) (2012) (transfer of exclusive rights, to be valid, requires a writing
signed by author or copyright owner); French Code of Intellectual Property arts. L. 131-3(1).
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copyright contracts, as we have seen in the Dutch law.35
Outcomes may be more predictable if it is clear from the outset whether the
issue is characterized as one of substantive copyright law, or instead as one of
contract law. But, in addition to the difficulties of distinguishing the respective
domains, general rules of private international law inject a further complication:
characterization typically comes within the judicial competence of the forum, and
different national courts may adopt different characterizations of the same issue
(with consequently different results).36 One can anticipate that, as the stronger
party, the exploiter might avoid the application of author-protective copyright laws
by imposing a choice of forum clause that will ensure the competence of a court
likely to characterize the dispute as one of contract rather than of substantive
copyright law. By the same token, the choice of forum clause might select a
country unlikely to find that the law of the contract (assuming the national law of
the forum is different) violates its fundamental public policies.
National copyright laws, however, might remove this layer of analysis by
anticipating the international dimension of copyright transfers and articulating
when the national law will nonetheless apply, in effect designating the national
author-protective rules as of overriding mandatory application. This technique will
instruct local courts as to which law governs. If the question of the scope of the
contract comes before another jurisdiction, those courts’ application of the foreign
rule will depend on whether the relevant jurisdiction acknowledges another state’s
mandatory rules.37 The 2015 Dutch copyright amendments and the 2002 German
copyright amendments that inspired it offer examples of this approach. As we will
see, the answers to the questions whether local authors (or indeed foreign authors
as well) will obtain the protections of local law when their works are exploited
within a given territory may differ based on those countries’ (and foreign fora’s)
approaches to identifying the applicable law.
1. Territorial Application of the Dutch Law on Authors’ Contracts
The Dutch law specifies the circumstances under which its author-protective
provisions will apply, in the event that the contract contains a choice of law clause
designating the governance of the contract by a law other than that of the
Netherlands, or in the event that the contract does not contain a choice of law

35. Dutch Copyright Contract Act art. 2(3) (“Whole or partial assignment, as well as the grant of
an exclusive licence, may only be effected by means of a deed executed for that purpose. The
assignment or the grant of an exclusive licence shall comprise only the rights that are stated in the deed
or that necessarily derive from the nature and purpose of the title or the grant of the licence.”)
36. See, e.g., ALI Principles of Intellectual Property, Introduction (2008) (“The Principles . . .
leave to the forum general issues of private international and procedural law, such as those concerning
standing, characterization . . . .”). In the E.U., the Court of Justice has ruled that the characterization of
a dispute as in contract or in tort is a matter of E.U. law. See Case C-548/12, Brogsitter v. Fabrication
de Montres Normandes, 2014 E.C.R. 148.
37. On giving effect to a third country’s mandatory rules, see, e.g., ALI Principles of Intellectual
Property § 323 (2008); CLIP art. 3:901(1) (2011).
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clause.38 The law thus follows neither the lex contractus approach that leaves to
the parties’ choice the law applicable to the modalities of the transfer, nor a full lex
protectionis approach through which the law of each country for which rights are
granted determines both the scope of the grant of rights and the conditions on their
transfer.
Article 25h
...
2. Regardless of the law that governs the contract, the provisions of this chapter shall
apply if:
a. the contract would have been governed by Dutch law when no applicable law
had been chosen; or
b. the acts of exploitation take place or should take place wholly or predominantly
in the Netherlands.39

The text goes on to provide that the Dutch rules for authors’ copyright contracts
will apply if “the contract would have been governed by Dutch law when no
applicable law had been chosen,” i.e., if the contract were localized in the
Netherlands.40 The text implicitly refers to article 4 of the European Union’s Rome
I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations.41 Article 4 of the
Rome I Regulation provides in relevant part:
Article 4: Applicable law in the absence of choice
1. To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been chosen in
accordance with Article 3 . . . , the law governing the contract shall be determined as
follows:
(a) a contract for the sale of goods shall be governed by the law of the country
where the seller has his habitual residence;
(b) a contract for the provision of services shall be governed by the law of the
country where the service provider has his habitual residence . . . ;
2. Where the contract is not covered by paragraph 1 or where the elements of the
38. The Dutch law appears to be inspired by art. 32(b) of the German Copyright Act which
provides:
Article 32b
Compulsory application
The application of Articles 32 and 32a [on equitable remuneration and redress of “conspicuous
disproportion” in authors’ remuneration] shall be compulsory
1. if German law would be applicable to the exploitation agreement in the absence of a choice of
law, or
2. to the extent that the agreement covers significant acts of exploitation within the territory to
which this Act applies.
According to one of the leading commentators on the German copyright law, the purpose of this
provision “was to protect the remuneration rights in section 32a against circumvention by resort to
foreign laws.” Paul Katzenberger, sec. 32b, No. 3, in URHEBERRECHT KOMMENTAR (Gerhardt
Schricker & Ulrich Loewenheim eds., 4th ed. 2010).
39. Dutch Copyright Contract Act art. 25h.
40. Id.
41. Rome I.

GINSBURG & SIRINELLI, PRIVATE INT’L LAW ASPECTS OF AUTHORS’ CONTRACTS, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 171 (2015)

180

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[39:2

contract would be covered by more than one of points (a) to (h) of paragraph 1, the
contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the party required to effect
the characteristic performance of the contract has his habitual residence.
3. Where the law applicable cannot be determined pursuant to paragraphs 1 or 2, the
contract shall be governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely
connected.42

As a first step, it is necessary to ascertain what kind of contract a grant of
copyright is. Is it a contract for sale of goods? If so, the Rome I Regulation
localizes the contract at the author’s residence. But, transfer of exploitation rights
from the author to an exploiter might be considered a “contract for the provision of
services,” since the exploiter is supposed to publish, broadcast, etc., the work. In
that event, the contract is localized at the residence of the exploiter, leading to the
opposite result from the law that would be applicable were the contract considered
one for the sale of goods. If neither of these characterizations applies, article 4 of
the Rome I Regulation provides a residual point of attachment: the law of the
member state of the party owing the characteristic performance.43 But who is that,
as between the author or the exploiter? One might say “the exploiter” (for
example, the publisher), but were that so, the contract would not be subject to
Dutch law if the publisher is not habitually resident in the Netherlands, even if the
author is. (For reasons explored below, article 25h(2)(b) does not necessarily save
the situation for “Dutch” authors, i.e. authors who are habitually resident in the
Netherlands.) By contrast, if the publisher resides in the Netherlands, then the
Dutch law conditions on the author’s grant of rights would appear to apply even if
the author does not reside in the Netherlands and even with respect to exploitations
taking place outside the Netherlands. The last observation stems from the structure
of article 25h, which prefaces (2)(b) with “or,” which would means that it is not
necessary that the exploitation take place wholly or predominantly in the
Netherlands so long as the contract is localized in the Netherlands. Subsection
(2)(b) applies if the contract is not localized in the Netherlands.
If, on the other hand, the debtor of the characteristic performance is the author,
then authors having their habitual residence in the Netherlands will get the benefit
of the law’s unwaivable (article 25h(1)) protections. It appears that those
protections apply to multiterritorial grants as well, so that the author could, for
example, claim from the co-contractant publisher the benefits of the best seller
clause if the book is a great and unanticipated success in Portugal, or the author
could reclaim the rights if the co-contractant publisher (wherever resident), having
received rights for Italy, failed to exploit them there. These outcomes—which
seem consistent with the specifications in 25d and 25c(6) (unknown uses) that the
author’s right may be enforced against the original grantee’s successors—would
follow from application of the Dutch law rules, regardless of whether Portuguese

42. Id. art. 4.
43. Id. Subsection (4) offers another residual point of attachment, but if the contract is between
residents of different states and provides for multiterritorial exploitation, with which country will the
contract be “most closely connected”? Id. art. 4(4).
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copyright law includes a “best seller clause,” or whether Italian law includes a
“use-it-or-lose-it” condition on authors’ grants to exploiters. This localization of
the contract therefore produces an extraterritorial application of substantive Dutch
copyright law.44
Article 4(3) establishes another residual point of attachment, which, given the
difficulty of determining which party, author or exploiter renders the “characteristic
performance,” might prove the best adapted: the country with which the contract is
most closely connected.45 When author and exploiter reside in the same country,
that country would seem to have the closest nexus, particularly if the exploitation
comprehends the country of common residence. When one party resides in the
same country as one of the countries of exploitation, that country would have a
good claim to close connection. When the parties’ residence does not converge
with a country of exploitation, the country where the work is first exploited might
qualify as the nexus state.
Article 25h(2)(b) sets out an alternative point of attachment that largely avoids
applying Dutch rules to exploitations occurring outside the Netherlands (but gives
rise to other problems): if the contract is not localized in the Netherlands, the new
Dutch law will still apply if “the acts of exploitation take place or should take place
wholly or predominantly in the Netherlands.”46 The law does not, however, define
“predominantly.” It is not clear therefore whether the law will apply if somewhat
over half the exploitation occurs in the Netherlands, or only if considerably more
than half (a proportion closer to “wholly”), or instead if the country in which the
greatest proportion of exploitation, even if less than half, occurs. Whatever the
meaning of “predominantly,” it follows that if the contract is neither localized in
nor wholly or predominantly carried out in the Netherlands, the author (whether or
not residing in the Netherlands) will not enjoy the protections of the Dutch
copyright law even with respect to those exploitations that do take place in the
Netherlands. For example, if the localization of the contract in the Netherlands
turns on the publisher’s being resident in the Netherlands, then Dutch resident
authors may not get the benefit of the Dutch law even as to exploitations in the
Netherlands if their contracts grant multiterritorial rights to non-Dutch publishers.
Yet, if the Dutch resident author is contracting with a non-Dutch publisher, the
chances seem strong that the exploitation contracted-for will not be wholly or

44. The problem of extraterritoriality persists even if both the author and the exploiter are
residents of the Netherlands (which might make the Netherlands the country with which the contract is
most closely connected under Rome I art. 4(3)), because Dutch law would still apply to exploitations in
other countries for which the contract grants rights.
45. Dutch Copyright Act art. 4(3). Regarding the difficulty of determining whose performance is
“characteristic” when an author grants exploitation rights, see, e.g., André Lucas, comment on Cour
d’Appel Paris, Apr. 2, 2003, Martinelli v. Gallimard, 198 RIDA 413, 9 PROPRIÉTÉS
INTELLECTUELLES 392 (Oct. 2003).
46. Dutch Copyright Contract Act art. 25h(2)(B). It seems, however, unlikely that a contract
granting exploitation rights solely or predominantly for the Netherlands would not also be localized
there. But one might at least hypothesize a contract between an author and publisher resident in the
same foreign country, and that the parties’ common residence might result in localizing the contract in a
country other than the one of exploitation.
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principally limited to exploitations in the Netherlands.47
Putting the pieces together, it seems that the law does not fully ensure that Dutch
resident authors get the benefit of the new law, even with respect to exploitations
occurring in the Netherlands.48 It is unlikely such an outcome was intended, but
even the best possible construction (for authors), which would make the author the
debtor of the characteristic performance, is problematic, since it would give authors
residing in the Netherlands the benefit of the new law not only for exploitations in
the Netherlands but also in other countries covered by the contract and thus would
have an extraterritorial effect not sought by the parties to the contract (since, if the
statutory criteria are met, Dutch law will apply “[r]egardless of the law that governs
the contract”).49
2. Territorial Application of the French Law on Authors’ Contracts
Unlike the new Dutch law, the 2014 French law on authors’ contracts does not
include a provision on territorial application, but the subsisting general law on
copyright, which derives from the 1957 copyright law, specially exempts certain
international contracts from the obligation to pay proportional remuneration. The
French Code of Intellectual Property article L132-6 derogates from the general rule
requiring proportional remuneration in article L131-3-4 by providing that “grants
of right by or to a person or enterprise established abroad may be the objects of a
flat sum remuneration.”50
A few observations about the scope of this exception: it is not a general
derogation from the obligations of French copyright-contract law when one of the
parties does not reside in France; article L132-6 addresses only remuneration, and
then only if the contract specifies flat fee payment. Its terms do not purport to
extend to the legally imposed contractual obligations such as those set out in article
L131-3 requiring specific mention of the rights granted, their scope and purpose,
and their geographic extent and duration. By the same token, while the 2014 law
on authors’ contracts does not repeal article L132-6, so that the 2014 provisions on
proportional remuneration will not apply if the contract to which one of the parties
is a non-French resident provides for flat fee payment, neither does article L132-6
affect the 2014 law’s other provisions, for example, those articulating the scope of
flat fee payments,51 and those regarding the publisher’s duties of timely
47. On the other hand, non-Dutch resident authors would get the benefit of the new Dutch law in
the (probably unlikely) event that the non-Dutch resident author’s contract with the non-Netherlands
publisher grants rights only or predominantly for the Netherlands.
48. By contrast, art. 32(b)(2) of the German Copyright Act on which the Dutch law is based does
not require that the exploitation take place “wholly or predominantly” in Germany; any exploitation in
Germany will entitle the author to the benefits of German law as to those exploitations.
49. Dutch Copyright Contract Act art. 25h(2).
50. French Code of Intellectual Property art. L132-6 (« Peuvent également faire l’objet d’une
rémunération forfaitaire les cessions de droits à ou par une personne ou une entreprise établie à
l’étranger. »)
51. While art. L132-6 sets out exceptions to the rule of proportional remuneration, it does not
entitle the publisher to pay a single lump sum for an undifferentiated grant of all rights. Other
provisions of the law prohibit all-rights grants. See, e.g., art. L131-1 (global grant of rights in future
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exploitation of the work. These would continue to apply (at least when French law
governs the contract) even when one of the parties to the contract does not reside in
France. Similarly, if the contract with a non-French-resident party provides for
proportional remuneration, but the calculation of that remuneration does not
conform to the provisions of the 2014 law, article L132-6 does not provide a basis
for exempting the contract from the obligations of the 2014 law.52
Article L132-6, it should be noted, does not designate the application of another
law to govern the mode of remuneration when one of the parties to the contract
does not reside in France. The law assumes the contract will be governed by
French law, and simply allows the parties to choose between a regime of
proportional remuneration and one of flat-payment remuneration. In either event,
French law will determine the contours of the regime. Thus, for example, if the
parties choose a flat-payment regime, they will remain subject to article L131-5,
which provides that “in the event of a grant of rights of exploitation, when the
author has incurred a prejudice of more than 7/12 as a result of a harmful act or
insufficient anticipation of the economic results of the work, the author may
demand a revision of the conditions of the price of the contract. This demand may
be made only if the [rights in the] work were granted against a flat sum payment.”53
In sum, the international contracts to which article L132-6 pertains are international
with respect to the parties, but French with respect to the governing law.54
Accordingly all provisions of the French copyright law concerning authors’
contracts remain applicable.
French courts have interpreted article L132-6 to mean that the obligation to pay
royalties does not implicate a French public policy so important that the obligation
must be imposed on contracts not otherwise governed by French law. In 1989, the
Paris Court of Appeals in Anne Bragance v. Michel de Grèce, a controversy arising
out of a New York law contract between a French ghostwriter and a New York
resident nominal author regarding the publication of a French-language book in
France, held that, whatever the law otherwise applicable to the contract, French law
prohibited assignment of the ghostwriter’s moral right of “paternity” to be

works is void); 131-3(3) (grant of audiovisual rights must be distinct). The reference in art. L132-5 and
132-6 to « une rémunération forfaitaire » does not mean a single payment for all forms of exploitation,
any more than does art. L132-5’s reference to « une remuneration proportionnelle » mean a single
royalty for all forms of exploitation.
52. For example, art. L132-17-3(2) requires that royalties for the sale of ebooks be calculated on
the basis of the sale price of the book.
53. French Code of Intellectual Property art. L131-5 (« En cas de cession du droit d’exploitation,
lorsque l’auteur aura subi un préjudice de plus de sept douzièmes dû à une lésion ou à une prévision
insuffisante des produits de l’ouvre, il pourra provoquer la révision des conditions de prix du
contrat. Cette demande ne pourra être formée que dans le cas où l’ouvre aura été cédée moyennant une
rémunération forfaitaire. »)
54. See, e.g., Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch., Nov. 3, 2010, Osterrath
v. Ste Univers Poche, 38 PROPRIÉTÉS INTELLECTUELLES 192 (2011) obs. A. Lucas (holding that the
authorization in art. L132-6 to remunerate by flat fee instead of by royalties when one of the parties does
not reside in France does not dispense co-contractants from other obligations imposed by art. L132-6,
such as the requirement that, in the case of translations, the agreement on flat fee remuneration must be
express and in writing).
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recognized as the author of the book.55 By contrast, the court further held that, in
light of then-article 36(2), as enumerated in the 1957 French Copyright Law,
French law did not bar flat fee remuneration when one of the parties did not reside
in France.56 Since the option to forego royalties was already available under
French law if one of the co-contractants resides abroad, it could not be said that the
obligation to pay royalties expressed a French public policy of such importance that
it must be imposed on contracts governed by other national laws when one of the
parties does not reside in France.57
The different outcomes of the moral and economic rights claims in Anne
Bragance v. Michel de Grèce suggest a greater intensity of public policy with
respect to rights under copyright that French law declares inalienable. The
waivability of certain economic rights in certain circumstances denotes as to those
rights a relatively weak domestic policy that does not warrant imposition on foreign
law contracts. By contrast, the strength of the domestic inalienability rule
regarding moral rights indicates that the parties to a contract may not elude that
prohibition by subjecting their contract to another law, at least not with respect to
exploitations taking place in France.
The highest civil law court, the Cour de cassation, shortly thereafter confirmed
this result in Huston v. Turner Entertainment, involving the broadcast in France of
a colorized black and white motion picture, against the wishes of the U.S. director
and screenwriter.58 Under the law of their contract, however, they had no rights
under U.S. copyright and further assigned any economic and moral rights they
might have had for other countries. The court disregarded the law of the contract
and directly applied the French law prohibition on assignment of moral rights.
Significantly, the court addressed only the French broadcast; the court did not rule
that French law overrode the assignment with respect to the other territories for
which the authors had granted rights. It appears, therefore, that the inalienability of
moral rights is a loi de police, or overriding mandatory rule requiring territorial
application of the national norm without regard for (or inquiry into) the otherwise

55.
56.
57.

Cour d’appel [CA] Paris 1e ch., Apr. 19, 1989, RIDA 1989, 360, obs. Sirinelli.
Id.
See also Cour d’appel Paris, 4e ch., Apr. 2, 2003, RIDA 2003, 413, 9 PROPRIÉTÉS
INTELLECTUELLES 392 (Oct. 2003), obs. A. Lucas. The court rejected a claim brought by two Italianresident photographers for additional remuneration for distribution of French translation of illustrated
guidebooks when photographers entered into a flat fee all-rights publishing contract with a Hong King
publisher. The court held the contract was governed by English law, and that the scope of the grant was
valid under that law. The court did not address whether application of English law would violate French
public policy. By contrast, and without discussing the basis for its choice of law, the court applied
French law to the photographers’ moral rights claims against the publication of certain photographs
without proper attribution. Arguably, the court implicitly ranged issues of transmission of economic
rights as matters falling within the scope of the law of the contract, and issues of moral rights as either
coming within the substantive copyright law of the country of exploitation (France) or as covered by
French mandatory rules overriding the otherwise applicable law, with respect to exploitations in France.
58. Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters], May 28, 1991, IIC 1992,
702. See also Jane C. Ginsburg & Pierre Sirinelli, Authors and Exploitations in International Private
Law: The French Supreme Court and the Huston Film Colorization Controversy, 15 COLUM.-VLA J.L.
& ARTS 135 (1991).
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applicable law.59
Neither Bragance nor Huston squarely addresses the question of the application
of French law norms to contracts governed by foreign law when the French norms
concern the scope of the grant of economic rights (other than the statutory option in
international contracts to elect a flat payment form of remuneration). Nor do they
distinguish between French-resident authors’ and non-French-resident authors’
entitlement to the protection of those norms in France when a foreign law governs
the contract. Similarly, neither do these authorities consider different applicable
law outcomes, when French law does govern the contract, between exploitations in
or outside of France. In general, most French authorities, including most scholars,
assume or affirm that the foreign law designated in an international contract will
govern the scope of the grant and the modes of its transfer unless the French courts
deem the local norm to express a domestic public policy so significant that the local
norm should displace the otherwise applicable foreign law.60 It also appears that
French authorities do not consider domestic rules dictating the form of the contract
(for example, the requirement that the grant be in writing or manifest a particular
level of specificity) to be overriding mandatory rules or to meet the standards of
ordre public international;61 as a result, a contract governed by foreign law need
not conform to French rules of formal validity.62
Several aspects of the 2014 amendments nonetheless suggest that the law
implements public policies that the French legislator would not have wished the
parties to evade by submitting the contract to a foreign law. As an initial matter,
foreign contract law cannot displace substantive French copyright rules; one might
therefore endeavor to ascertain which aspects of the 2014 law are substantive
copyright rules, and which fall within the domain of contract law, for only the latter
features are at risk of avoidance through application of a foreign contract law. As
suggested earlier, however, separating substantive from contractual obligations is a
difficult and uncertain exercise, and one we will not undertake here.
Even as to features of the 2014 law properly classified as contractual, most of
the dispositions are mandatory as a matter of domestic law; that is, the parties may
not contract out of the new obligations. Moreover, in its search to ensure that
authors receive “just and equitable” remuneration for digital exploitations, the 2014
law details a variety of means to that end, particularly where the traditional
economic model of royalties based on sales of copies of books no longer represents
the online economic model. The legislature further expressed its strong intent to
ensure effective author protections by extending the 2014 law’s application to
contracts concluded before the new law’s entry into force.

59. See, e.g., Ginsburg & Sirinelli, supra note 58.
60. See, e.g., Tristan Azzi, Les contrats d’exploitation des droits de propriété littéraire et
artistique en DIP: Etat des questions, 214 RIDA 3, 53 (Oct. 2007); Conseil Supérieur de la propriété
littéraire et artistique, Rapport de la commission spécialisée portant sur la loi applicable en matière de
propriété littéraire et artistique p. 11 (2003); cf. Rome I art. 12(1)(a); CLIP 3:506(1)(a) (law of contract
covers interpretation).
61. See, e.g., PROPRIÉTÉS INTELLECTUELLES, supra note 57, at 394, nn. 70–71.
62. Unless these are characterized as matters of substantive copyright law, see discussion infra.
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While the French law does not specify its territorial application, it is reasonable
to infer a legislative intent to retain control over some extraterritorial effects of the
contract. For example, foreign exploitations undertaken by the original French
publisher, such as making available ebook downloads or online consultations of
text to customers located outside of France, would remain within the ambit of the
2014 amendments in light of their close connection to France. Indeed, given the
2014 law’s focus on digital exploitations, it would be self-defeating were the
parties able to invoke the inherently multinational nature of digital exploitations as
the basis for avoiding the application of French law. But the territorial ambitions of
the 2014 reforms are not so bold as to reach all extraterritorial transactions, as the
following scenario demonstrates. Suppose the publishing contract granted
worldwide rights to a French publisher. The publisher then grants foreign
publishers exploitation rights for their separate territories. These contracts provide
for a single payment from each foreign publisher. The French publisher may have
a duty to account to the French author for these transactions, but even were the
subgrants to foreign publishers governed by French law, the author would have no
claims against the foreign publishers because the author is not a party to those
contracts.
The best interpretation of the international application of the 2014 French
reforms (to the extent they are characterized as contractual rather than substantive)
would deem them rules of mandatory application (lois de police) to exploitations of
works taking place in (or in the case of digital exploitations, originating from)
France. Even without the explicit provision found in the new Dutch law, it is
possible to infer from the law’s detailed and unwaivable obligations a legislative
intent to preserve the benefits of the author-protective reforms in France when the
transaction has a substantial connection to France.
B. WHAT LAW SHOULD APPLY TO MANDATORY AUTHOR-PROTECTIVE
PROVISIONS OF DOMESTIC COPYRIGHT LAW?63
Our analysis of the Dutch and French laws shows that some ambiguity remains
whether the author-protective provisions of these laws will in fact entitle authors
(whether or not resident in those states) to the benefits of the legislature’s
recalibration of the power relationship between creators and exploiters, at least for
exploitations in those states, when the contract covers multiple territories and
designates a different national law. We now address what law we believe should
apply in such situations.64

63. Proposals for specific prescriptive provisions on the territorial application of author-protective
copyright contract laws have been inspired by the deliberations of the International Law Association
Committee on Intellectual Property and Private International Law, of which one of the authors is a
member.
64. We acknowledge that the most direct and consistent way to protect authors as the weaker
parties to contracts for the exploitation of their works would be through international harmonization of
the substantive rules of authors’ contracts. Since a multilateral instrument seems unlikely in the nearterm, a second-best approach is to harmonize the conflict of law rules.
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As a starting point, one might observe that where domestic law does not permit
the parties to contract out of local author protections, it seems problematic to
achieve the prohibited objective by selecting as the contract’s governing law a
national law that either lacks those protections or allows the parties to contract out
of them. Because many publishers may demand multiterritorial rights either to
exploit themselves, for example, over the Internet, or to be exercised by foreign
branches of the same publisher, or to grant to foreign publishers, it is likely that
most publishing contracts will cover more than one country. Moreover, given its
international character, the contract may well choose a law other than that of the
author’s residence. If all that is needed to elude local author protections is to select
a different country’s law to govern the contract, then only purely local (and
accordingly, probably small) publishers will have to abide by local authorprotective rules. That the biggest economic actors prove the least subject to the
obligations of the author’s local law, while the smallest actors bear most of the
burden of compliance, also seems undesirable.
The strongest argument in favor of allowing the law that is chosen to govern the
contract to cover all issues of scope, interpretation, and form of the grant
emphasizes the simplification of multinational copyright exploitation. If the work
has multiple authors, all from different countries, and/or the publisher (or other
intermediary exploiter) anticipates exploiting the work in multiple territories, each
of whose author-protective measures applied, the publisher’s actual acquisition of
rights may depend on compliance with multiple local and possibly inconsistent
obligations, or may be curtailed by local limitations on the scope of the grant. In
theory, it is advantageous to the parties to the contract (or to the stronger party to
the contract, most likely the exploiter rather than the author) to select a single law
to govern the extent of the transfer of rights and the means by which the transfer is
effectuated. Thus, local law obligations to state the nature and scope of the rights
with specificity, or to provide additional remuneration for the transfer of certain
kinds of rights, or to provide proportional remuneration, or to exercise the rights
granted within a certain period, all yield to the law of the contract’s resolution of
those issues. The resulting simplification promotes the efficient multinational
exploitation of works of authorship.
On closer reflection, however, privileging the law of the contract may not in fact
significantly reduce complexity. First, objections to the application of multiple
national laws are overstated. Even if the law of the contract governs issues that fall
within the domain of contract law, that law does not trump substantive national
copyright norms. For example, it is clear that an author cannot grant rights that do
not exist in the territories for which the rights are granted, even if the rights exist
under the law chosen to govern the contract; the contract cannot effectively create
new rights in those countries.65 By the same token, if the duration of copyright in
the country whose law governs the contract is longer than the duration of copyright
in some of the countries for which rights are granted, the contract cannot effectively

65. See, e.g., ALI Principles of Intellectual Property § 301 (2008); CLIP art. 3:102 (2011) (law of
country for which protection is sought governs existence of rights in that country).
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extend the copyright term for those countries.
Thus, to the extent that the matter concerns substantive rights under copyright,
the exploiter will have to take into account many local incursions into the
transaction, whatever the law that governs the contract. Admittedly, construing the
domains of contract law and copyright law to allocate most issues of scope to the
former will help simplify the transaction by submitting those issues to the single
law of the contract. Uncertainty may nonetheless persist so long as characterization
of the issue as one of contract or of copyright remains a matter for the law of the
forum, although a forum selection clause may direct litigation to a forum whose
characterizations favor the party urging the application of exploiter-friendly
contract rules.66
Second, the prospect that local mandatory rules may override the chosen
contract law both reintroduces complexity and adds further uncertainty to the mix.
The simplification that results from vesting the law of the contract with competence
to determine issues of scope and means is therefore misleading, because one cannot
always anticipate when local authorities will deem the author-protective rule to be
of overriding mandatory application in a given territory. Parties planning an
international exploitation of the work therefore cannot count on the application of
the law of the contract and thus ignore the provisions of local laws regulating
authors’ contracts. Rather, they will need to take these into account in order to
assess the likelihood that in a given jurisdiction the copyright law or local
authorities will privilege the local norm over the contractual norm. Thus, business
planning remains complex, with the added risks flowing from the unpredictability
of the imposition of other national norms. A forum-selection clause may diminish
this risk as well, but may not eliminate it entirely;67 even if the forum would not
find the author-oppressive law of the contract to violate the forum’s own
mandatory rules, it might apply another country’s mandatory rules with respect to
exploitations occurring in that territory.68
66. Of course, ensuring both favorable characterization rules and favorable contract rules may
require designating one country for purposes of the contract’s choice of law clause, and another for
purposes of the forum selection clause.
67. Such clauses, albeit having the effect of “deactivating” one country’s mandatory rules, may
well be enforceable. See, e.g., Edouard Treppoz, La loi applicable à la titularité - Quelle place pour
l’universalisme après le repli territorialiste de la Cour de cassation?, in L’ENTREPRISE ET LA
TITULARITÉ DES DROITS DE PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE 15 (Dir. J.-M. Bruguière, Dalloz, coll) (2015).
68. See Rome I art. 9(3) (“Effect may be given to the overriding mandatory provisions of the law
of the country where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed, in so
far as those overriding mandatory provisions render the performance of the contract unlawful. In
considering whether to give effect to those provisions, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose
and to the consequences of their application or non-application.”). The threshold of incompatibility
between the chosen law and the “overriding mandatory provisions,” however, is very high; it does not
suffice that the local provision cannot be derogated from by agreement. See, e.g., Symeon C.
Symeonides, The Hague Principles on Choice of Law for International Contracts: Some Preliminary
Comments, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 873, 882–89 (2013); see also HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, HAGUE PRINCIPLES ON CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS (Mar. 19, 2015):
Article 11
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A truly simpler approach would treat issues of scope and mode (form as well as
substance of contract) as part of the substantive right transferred, and therefore
would subject all of them to local copyright law, rather than the chosen contract
law. Arguably, this approach leaves little room for party autonomy. The
observation may be true, but it also misses the point: the purpose of authorprotective laws is to override party “autonomy.” On the other hand, national
legislatures may be most solicitous of their own resident authors; they may be less
concerned to tamper with the “freedom” of nonresident authors to enter into leonine
contracts with nonresident exploiters. An approach that classed all issues of scope
and mode with substantive rights would entitle nonresident as well as resident
authors to local protections, even when the center of gravity of the contract might
lie elsewhere. Admittedly, a national legislature might well intend such a result;
indeed that appears to be the case, for example, under the U.S. Copyright Act’s
termination right, which allows all authors of works protected in the U.S. to
terminate grants of U.S. rights (but not foreign rights), regardless of the law that
governs the contract of transfer of rights.69 Even where the legislature is focused
on protecting local authors, it still might intend for local protections to apply to all,
lest foreign authors compete unfairly with local authors by contracting out of the
application of burdensome obligations on publishers.
Characterization, however, is a double-edged sword: classing all questions of
scope and mode as going to the substance of the copyright law would limit the
effect of author-protective legislation to the territory of that country, so that the
scope of a contract between parties both resident in that country but granting
foreign as well as domestic rights would depend on the law of each country of
exploitation. For example, a French publisher would have no duty to account to the
author for exploitations the publisher undertakes abroad if the copyright laws of the
countries of exploitation impose no similar obligation. Thus, even though the
center of gravity of the author-publisher relationship may be France, under an
approach that characterizes questions of scope and mode as going to the substantive
Overriding mandatory rules and public policy (ordre public)
1. These Principles shall not prevent a court from applying overriding mandatory
provisions of the law of the forum which apply irrespective of the
law chosen by the parties.
2. The law of the forum determines when a court may or must apply or take into account
overriding mandatory provisions of another law.
See generally Symeonides, supra at 889:
[T]he [Hague] Principles adopt a fairly high threshold for the mandatory-rules exception, which,
combined with the traditionally high threshold for the order-public exception, produces a very
liberal party-autonomy regime. Such a regime is acceptable, indeed welcome, in international
commercial contracts between parties with relatively equal bargaining power. However, in
contracts such as those involving the afore-mentioned franchisees and other small business
owners, this regime will worsen the existing inequalities by enabling the stronger parties to
impose well-calculated combinations of choice-of-law-and-forum clauses that will deprive the
weaker parties of any meaningful protection. This is a regrettable feature of the Principles.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(5) (2012); see Corcovado Music Corp. v. Hollis Music, Inc., 981 F.2d
679, 682 (2d Cir. 1993).
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copyright law, there is no center of gravity, merely a set of distinct countries of
exploitation.
If the principal shortcoming of a fully territorialist approach (expressed by a rule
that characterizes all issues of scope and mode as coming within the domain of the
substantive copyright law, rather than of the contract) is to render multinational
exploitation, particularly over the Internet, excessively complex, then an alternative
approach, one that relies on the connecting factor of the author’s residence, is
simpler to apply (at least where the work is single-authored, or all co-authors reside
in the same country), but manifests different troubling consequences. Suppose the
rule designated the copyright-contract law of the author’s residence to govern the
scope of the grant for all countries.70 For example, the rule might state:
The law chosen by the parties to a contract of transfer of rights under copyright or
neighboring rights shall not have the result of depriving an author or performer of the
protection afforded to him or her by the provisions that cannot be derogated from by
agreement under the law of his or her State of habitual residence at the time of
conclusion of the contract.71

If the law of the state of habitual residence at the time of conclusion of the
contract includes mandatory provisions whose application is not expressly limited
to the territory of that state, their prohibition on contracting out of the pertinent
protections would apply not only to exploitations in the state of habitual residence,
but also to all other territories covered by the contract.72 Suppose, for example, a
U.K. law contract between a French author and a British publisher transferring
worldwide print and digital rights. French law requires separate specification of the
print and digital grants, on pain of nullity of the contract;73 U.K. law imposes no
similar requirement.74 If the protections of the author’s home state apply to the full
territorial scope of her grant, then the transaction will be void even with respect to
states lacking those protections and even if the principal exploitation of the work
occurs outside her home state. As discussed in connection with the new Dutch
measures, it is not clear why one state’s author should enjoy her home state’s
protections in other states. At least, the author should not enjoy these protections
when her publisher resides in a different state. Where author and publisher share a
residence, one might imagine that the state of common residence could seek to
regulate the grant of rights for the full territorial extent of their dealings. But local
publishers might elude that objective, notably by subcontracting foreign rights to

70. As noted in Part II.A.1, the new Dutch law may lead to this outcome, if the author is deemed
the debtor of the “characteristic performance” and the contract is localized on that basis at the author’s
residence.
71. Thanks to Marie-Elodie Ancel and to Edouard Treppoz for this formulation.
72. Compare Dutch Copyright Contract Act art. 25h(2)(a) (if the contract is localized in the
Netherlands, Dutch author-protective rules apply, without apparent distinction as to whether contract
covers other territories as well), with art. 25h(2)(b) (contract provides exclusively or predominantly for
exploitation in the Netherlands).
73. French Code of Intellectual Property art. L132-17-1.
74. See, e.g., Cour d’Appel Paris, Apr. 2, 2003, Martinelli v. Gallimard, 198 RIDA 413, 9
PROPRIÉTÉS INTELLECTUELLES 392 (Oct. 2003) obs. A. Lucas.
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foreign publishers. Unless the law of the state of common residence imposes its
author-protective obligations on the publisher’s successors in title,75 the first
publisher’s foreign grantee will incur none of those duties under a contract
governed by the law of the grantee’s state (assuming that state does not impose
similar obligations for the benefit of authors not party to the contract between
publishers).
Local mandatory rules that specify their territorial application afford one private
international law technique to ensure that authors preserve the protections of their
countries of residence whatever the law otherwise applicable to a grant of national
or international rights. We have seen that the Dutch law takes a step in this
direction, but may not go far enough in defining the international situations to
which the Dutch law will apply. The following text offers another attempt:
(1) Whatever the law applicable to the contract, all States may require that their courts
apply national laws that protect the rights of authors and that cannot be derogated
from by agreement.76
In that event, States should define the criteria of territorial application of such
provisions. The State may take into account and determine what weight to accord,
notably:
- the localization within its territory of the habitual residence of the author or of
his/her co-contractant, or of both, at the time of the conclusion of the contract;
- the exclusive or predominant exploitation of the work within the territory of the
State.
(2) The courts of one State may give effect to similar mandatory provisions of another
State when that State would apply its law to a grant that presents a close connection to
that State.
In order to determine whether to give effect to foreign mandatory rules regarding
authors’ contracts, national courts should take into account the consequences of their
application or non application.77

This approach gives national legislatures the possibility to direct courts to apply
their own, or other states’, author-protective laws regardless of the law that
otherwise applies to the contract. Under this text, the author’s habitual residence is
one consideration, but it is neither determinative (where the forum coincides with
the author’s residence) nor preclusive (when the author resides in another state).
75. As the Dutch law does with respect to the obligation to exploit the work, though it is not clear
that this provision was intended to bind foreign successors in title. Dutch Copyright Contract Act art.
25e(6) (“If the other party to the contract has assigned the copyright to a third party, then the maker may
also exercise the rights arising from the dissolution against that third party after having notified him, in
writing, of the dissolution as soon as possible.”).
76. Cf. Rome I art. 9(1) (“Overriding mandatory provisions are provisions the respect for which is
regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or
economic organization, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their
scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation.”). The
proposed rule is less stringent than Rome I, which states in Recital 37 that “[t]he concept of ‘overriding
mandatory provisions’ should be distinguished from the expression ‘provisions which cannot be
derogated from by agreement’ and should be construed more restrictively.” Rome I, recital 37.
77. Thanks to Marie-Elodie Ancel for this formulation. Cf. the more restrictive standard of Rome
I art. 9(3).
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Legislatures can give national courts more or less discretion as to the application of
the point (1) criteria. This approach builds in considerable flexibility, but presents
the concomitant disadvantage of complexity, since it would appear that each
country’s mandatory rules would apply only with respect to exploitations occurring
within that country’s borders. Moreover, complexity augments if various states
differently identify or weight the criteria or confer varying levels of discretion on
their courts. Finally, the rules risk “deactivation”78 by forum-selection clauses
designating courts of states that do not apply other states’ mandatory rules.
Another approach offers more simplicity, and may more successfully resolve
problems of extraterritoriality:
Limitations to the scope of the law applicable to the contract or its formal validity:
(1) (a) Regardless of the law applicable to a contract dealing with intellectual property
rights, a creator or a performer can invoke the protection afforded to him by the
provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement under the law of the State
where, under the contract, the exclusive or predominant exploitation of the rights is
due to take place.
(b) Where the place of exclusive or predominant exploitation of the rights cannot be
determined pursuant to letter (a), a creator or a performer can invoke the protection
afforded to him by the provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement under
the law of the State of his habitual residence at the time of conclusion of the contract.
Similarly, where several creators or performers habitually resident in different States
contract with another party, they can specify in the contract which law, among the
States of their habitual residence, will govern their inalienable rights; otherwise, they
can invoke the protection afforded to them by the provisions that cannot be derogated
from by agreement by the law of the State with which all of them are most closely
connected.79

This solution ranks the law of the country of predominant exploitation above the
law of the author(s)’ country of residence; whichever country’s author-protective
rules apply, they will control the full territorial extent of the transaction. In the
former case, the transaction’s center of gravity will be the country of exclusive or
predominant exploitation; the simplification gained by applying that country’s rules
to exploitations occurring in other states may well warrant extraterritorial spillover.
But that conclusion may turn on the understanding of “predominant”: as we have
seen in connection with the Dutch law,80 the term does not define what proportion
of the exploitations must take place in the norm-imposing country. The greater the
spillover, the more controversial the extraterritorial extension.
The alternative choice of law also depends on the meaning of “predominant,”
for the author-protective rules of the author(s)’ residence will apply only in the

78. See D. Bureau & H. Muir-Watt, L’impérativité désactivée, RCDIP, 2009.1, cited in E.
Treppoz, supra note 67.
79. Thanks to Marie-Elodie Ancel for this formulation. Cf. the more restrictive standard of Rome
I art. 9(3).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 46–47.
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absence of an exclusive or predominant place of exploitation. By proposing rules
to identify a single country for all co-authors, the alternative rule helpfully
confronts the potential complexity of a residence criterion when a multiplicity of
differently-residing authors or performers effects the transfer. The alternative rule
also reduces complexity by providing for the application of the author-protective
provisions of the (designated) country of residence to the whole transaction. We
have seen that extraterritorial application of the residence criterion may result in
applying a law that does not converge with the transaction’s center of gravity, but
this approach avoids that critique because the residence criterion comes into play
only in the absence of a contractual center of gravity. Nonetheless, the
extraterritorial application of the law of the author’s residence, particularly if that
law includes obligations whose non fulfillment voids the contract, may seem
exorbitant.
A final example would guarantee authors and performers the benefits of their
home states’ protective legislation, but would limit the application of those
provisions to the territory of the author’s or performer’s habitual residence.
Notwithstanding the law applicable to a contract of transfer of rights under copyright, a
creator may invoke the right of the country where she habitually resided at the time of
the work’s creation, for rights that cannot be waived/transferred under the law of that
country, but only for the rights under copyright exploited in that territory.
Notwithstanding the law applicable to a contract of transfer of neighboring rights, a
performer may invoke the right of the country where she habitually resided at the time of
the rendering of the performance, for rights that cannot be waived/transferred under the
law of that country, but only for the rights under neighboring rights exploited in that
territory.81

More rigid, but also more simple, this provision may offer the easiest rule to
adopt. (As discussed earlier, the rule does not preclude a national legislature from
making its author protections available to nonresident authors by characterizing
particular author-protective rules as substantive copyright rules, and therefore as
subject to the law of the country for which protection is sought.) For countries
other than the author’s residence, the rule preserves the law chosen by the parties to
govern the transaction.
CONCLUSION
Like other mandatory rules, the rules offered here depart from classic, contentneutral, private international law rules, because they seek to impose a particular
outcome. But content-neutral choice of law rules are what create the problem that
provoked this examination in the first place: the rule of “party autonomy,” which
directs courts to look to the law the parties choose for their contract, enables the

81.

Thanks to Mireille van Eechoud for this formulation.

GINSBURG & SIRINELLI, PRIVATE INT’L LAW ASPECTS OF AUTHORS’ CONTRACTS, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 171 (2015)

194

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[39:2

stronger party to avoid weaker party protections simply by submitting the contract
to a less-constraining national law. In other words, when there is an imbalance in
the power of the co-contractants, the rule of party autonomy is “neutral” only in
appearance. In fact, it favors the stronger party.82 Accordingly, the Rome I
Regulation recognizes that where the parties’ bargaining power is unequal, neutral
rules should yield to weaker party-protective rules. Recital 23 states: “As regards
contracts concluded with parties regarded as being weaker, those parties should be
protected by conflict of law rules that are more favourable to their interests than the
general rules.”83
In other words, corrective choice of law rules have already assaulted the edifice
of private international law;84 there is no call to apologize for departures from the
supposedly “neutral” default.85 The rules proposed here, moreover, remain within
the general private international law (nonsubstantive) framework because they in
no way instruct states to adopt author-protective measures.86 They simply
endeavor to ensure, if a state does determine to recalibrate the balance of power
between authors and exploiters, that the contract is not set to negate the state’s
efforts to protect its resident authors or to regulate transactions primarily focused
on that state.

82. See, e.g., Symeonides, supra note 68, at 889 (“[A] liberal party-autonomy regime . . . is
acceptable, indeed welcome, in international commercial contracts between parties with relatively equal
bargaining power. However, in contracts [between unequal commercial actors], this regime will worsen
the existing inequalities by enabling the stronger parties to impose well-calculated combinations of
choice-of-law-and-forum clauses that will deprive the weaker parties of any meaningful protection.”)
83. Rome I art. 9(3), recital 23. Rome I then identifies four types of contracts in which weakerparty rules override party autonomy: contracts of carriage (art. 5), consumer contracts (art. 6), insurance
contracts (art. 7), and individual employment contracts (art. 8). Recital 23 notwithstanding, Rome I
makes no general provision for weaker parties; outside these four categories, general solicitude for party
autonomy would leave imbalanced contractual relations unredressed. See generally Symeon C.
Symeonides, Party Autonomy in Rome I and II: An Outsider’s Perspective, 28 NIPR 191 (2010)
(describing and criticizing scope of party autonomy in Rome I).
84. For other examples of outcome-promoting choice of law rules, see, e.g., Rome I arts. 5–6.
85. For a general discussion of outcome-promoting choice of law rules, see BERNARD AUDIT AND
LOUIS D’AVOUT, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 168–69 (7th ed. 2013) (Conflict of law rules “can never
be perfectly neutral,” but to an increasing extent states are “orienting these rules toward a preferred
substantive result.” The result may be achieved through alternative points of attachment—the court is to
select the one which will validate the legal relationship (e.g., wills, filiation), or, as in Rome I arts. 5–6,
by allowing the protected person to select a more favorable law.)
86. One may nonetheless query whether that framework remains truly nonsubstantive. See, e.g.,
Hélène Gaudemet-Tallon, L’Utilisation de règles de conflit à caractère substantial dans les conventions
internationals (l’exemple des Conventions de la Haye), in MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR D’YVON
LOUSSOUARN 181 (1994).

